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Abstract
The proliferation of sensor networks, mobile and pervasive computing has provided the technological
push for a new class of participatory-sensing applications, based on sensing and aggregating user-
generated content, and transforming it into knowledge. However, given the power and value of both
the raw data and the derived knowledge, to ensure that the generators are commensurate beneﬁciaries,
we advocate an open approach to the data and intellectual property rights by treating user-generated
content, as well as derived information and knowledge, as a common-pool resource. In this paper, we
undertake an extensive review of experimental, commercial and social participatory sensory applica-
tions, from which we identify that a decentralised, community-oriented governance model is required
to support this approach. Furthermore, we show that Ostrom’s institutional analysis and development
framework, in conjunction with a framework for self-organising electronic institutions, can be used
to give both an architecture and algorithmic base for the requisite governance model, in terms of
operational and collective-choice rules speciﬁed in computational logic. This provides, we believe,
the foundations for engineering knowledge commons for the next generation of participatory-sensing
applications, in which the data generators are also the primary beneﬁciaries.
1 Introduction
Participatory sensing (Burke et al., 2006) is the process of leveraging user devices which are capable of
various sensor measurements, to gather data in a bottom-up fashion and gain knowledge from the analysis
of this data. It has already been applied in many varying domains, from trafﬁc and transportation (Mathur
et al., 2010; Costa et al., 2012), to environmental conditions (Mendez et al., 2011; Hasenfratz et al., 2012),
product pricing (Deng & Cox, 2009) and behavioural information (Miluzzo et al., 2008).
In all of these applications, individual users or devices are gathering data which is then aggregated by a third
party. Having collected this data, it is primarily this third party who reaps the beneﬁts from the analysis of the
data. The value of data gathered through these means has been estimated in the billions of dollars (Manyika
et al., 2011). While some organisations provide some return to contributors, usually in services, the equitability
of this arrangement is debatable (vanDijck, 2009). This has led to a call for the empowerment of users such that
they can achieve a fair exchange for their data (Buckingham Shum et al., 2012).
A key issue is the provision of tasks for participatory sensing. This is the process by which an entity
determines a set of parameters to sense, and builds community and infrastructure for this purpose. This is
often a top-down process: of the applications we have mentioned the majority are centralised. The result is
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that a single entity holds all of the collected data (often taking ownership or property rights of the data
provided by others (O’Hara & Shadbolt, 2010)), sets the policies regarding access to data and knowledge
derived from the data, and controls how these policies are changed.
This approach is in direct contrast to how some of the most successful resources for data and knowledge
have developed on the Internet. The Open Data Institute has shown the beneﬁts of open access to gov-
ernment data and that signiﬁcant additional value can be generated by allowing others open and permissive
access (Shadbolt et al., 2012). Wikipedia1 is an example where individuals contributing knowledge have
created an encyclopaedia at a scale which would be infeasible to do in a traditional top-down manner. Its
continued success is down to its decentralised governance which allows its users to direct the trajectory of
the site’s policy (Famiglietti, 2011).
To understand the implications of how these organisational structures affect user participation and the
associated beneﬁts from the data and knowledge generated, we look at how social organisations have
developed around knowledge repositories. Hess and Ostrom (2003) argue that information can be seen at a
common-pool resource (CPR) and thus analysed using the considerable existing literature on the commons
(Hess & Ostrom, 2006). Some initial investigations have been applying this approach to user-generated
content (Pitt, 2012b) which we take further here.
From her signiﬁcant ﬁeld work on physical commons, Ostrom (1990: 42) outlined ‘the problem of
supplying a new set of institutions’. This is the problem that, in order to form an organisation, someone
must ﬁrst provide an initial set of rules by which the organisation and its members are governed. This is a
difﬁcult task as there are many stakeholders to satisfy under changeable conditions. Through survey
of both successful and unsuccessful institutions Ostrom extracted a set of principles which were more
prevalent in successful cases.
In participatory sensing we can empower users by providing themwith the ability to supply institutions,
and the knowledge to assess the effect of the rules and organisational structure governing sensing
applications. We review the literature analysing knowledge commons to derive an analytic framework
for institutional design of participatory-sensing applications construed as a provision and appropriation
system.We can then derive guidelines for ﬁrst, how a self-organising participatory-sensing application can
function as a provision and appropriation system using a knowledge commons, and second, how such a
system can be supplied.
This paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the theory behind information
and knowledge as a commons, and how participatory sensing can be seen as such a commons. We then
review participatory-sensing applications in Section 3. This is followed by an analysis of participatory
sensing as a knowledge commons according to Ostrom’s institutional analysis and development (IAD)
framework in Section 4. This analysis allows us to then create a formal representation of a system for self-
organising management of a participatory-sensing application as an information and knowledge commons
and subsequently evaluate this system. Our evaluation shows that such institutions could enable autono-
mous, heterogeneous agents to manage information and knowledge commons used for participatory-
sensing applications while maintaining important criteria such as sustainability, participation standards
and equity.
We ﬁnish, in Section 5, with some conclusions derived from this critical review and analysis of some
representative participatory applications, in particular that:
∙ Data clouds in open participatory-sensing applications can be construed as information and knowledge
commons and thus characterised by provision and appropriation actions.
∙ A system for access control (i.e. provision and appropriation) in participatory-sensing applications can
be designed according to Ostrom’s institutional design principles for self-governing institutions and
formally speciﬁed in an action language.
This provides the foundations for engineering knowledge commons for the next generation of
participatory-sensing applications, in which the data generators are also the primary beneﬁciaries.
1 http://www.wikipedia.org
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2 Data and knowledge as a commons
In this section we address how participatory sensing can be seen as an information and knowledge
commons. We give some background on the commons and introduce Ostrom’s work on managing CPRs.
We describe how the characteristics of information and knowledge as resources mean that repositories of
them can also be viewed as commons, and therefore managed in the same way.
The commons is a term generally used to describe shared resource systems. They are often also called
common-pool resource systems. These systems are characterised as systems where the ownership of the
resource system (land, air, etc.) and resource units (trees, radio frequencies, etc.) are shared, public
property or not covered by any property rights; and it is difﬁcult to exclude access to the resource and
resource units to others. Hardin (1968) theorised that these properties would inevitably lead to overuse
and depletion of the resource, a ‘Tragedy of the Commons’, and that enclosure (via privatisation or
centralisation) of the resource system was the only solution.
2.1 Governing the commons
Having done extensive ﬁeld work analysing both cases where this tragedy had been overcome and where it
had not, Ostrom (1990) contested that it was in fact possible to sustainably manage these resources
as a commons. The key to this success was how the commons were governed and how the individuals
involved in the use and maintenance of the commons were engaged in this governance. Ostrom identiﬁed
eight principles which, when all satisﬁed, increase the chances of a successful commons (Ostrom, 1990:
91–101):
1. Clearly deﬁned boundaries: ‘Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units
from the CPR must be clearly deﬁned, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself’.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions: ‘Appropriation rules
restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and
to provision rules requiring labor, materials, and/or money’.
3. Collective-choice arrangements: ‘Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in
modifying the operational rules’.
4. Monitoring: ‘Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour, are
accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators’.
5. Graduated sanctions: ‘Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed [sic]
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offence) by other appropriators,
by ofﬁcials accountable to these appropriators, or by both’.
6. Conﬂict-resolution mechanisms: ‘Appropriators and their ofﬁcials have rapid access to low-cost local
arenas to resolve conﬂicts among appropriators or between appropriators and ofﬁcials’.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organise: ‘The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions
are not challenged by external governmental authorities’.
8. Nested enterprises: ‘Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conﬂict resolution, and
governance activities are organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises’.
Ostrom later formalised the analysis methodology used as the IAD framework (Ostrom, 2005). This
framework examines the relevant factors in an institution which manages a commons, allowing the
evaluation of institutions with respect to Ostrom’s eight principles, and with respect to other institutions
which have been analysed in the same way. The framework can also be used for the design of institutions,
and we will use the framework in this way later in this article.
Since Ostrom’s (1990) book many new areas have been recognised as commons. It has been deemed
applicable to many shared resource problems: from transport to radio spectrum and the Internet (Hess,
2000). Many have emerged from technological innovations which have either created a new virtual
resource, or transformed the properties of a resource such that it is feasible to treat it as a commons. One
example is knowledge (Hess & Ostrom, 2006), with open-access publishing as a speciﬁc case study.
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2.2 Data, information and knowledge commons
The shift to treating knowledge as a commons has largely been enabled by the digitalisation of information
which has separated the knowledge from the physical format of publication (Hess & Ostrom, 2003). In this
section we consider data, information and knowledge as resources, and how they are managed. For this
discussion we require a deﬁnition of these terms within this context. Most deﬁnitions give a hierarchy
where data is just raw values, information is data organised in context, and knowledge is an understanding
of meaning of information and how to use it (Machlup, 1983; Davenport & Prusak, 2000; Shadbolt, 2013).
For example the tuple (51,0) would be data; adding the context that this tuple corresponds to latitude and
longitude transforms it into information; and knowledge would be the ability to provide directions to travel
to this location along public roads. It is generally thought that with current technology the creation of
knowledge requires human intervention (Davenport & Prusak, 2000), but data and information can be
generated independently by devices. In this work we will use these deﬁnitions for data, information and
knowledge.
Hess and Ostrom (2003) assessed how information and knowledge can be a commons by using a
classiﬁcation of exclusion and subtractability. Exclusion is a measure of how easy it is to exclude indi-
viduals from the beneﬁts of the good, either through physical or legal means. Subtractability (also called
rivalry) is a measure of the extent to which the beneﬁts consumed by one individual subtract from the
beneﬁts available to others. Combined these give a two-dimensional classiﬁcation of goods (see Table 1)
giving four types of goods: public goods, CPRs, toll or club goods, and private goods.
The shift that has occurred in information and knowledge due to technology is that its distribution has
become non-rivalrous (Hess & Ostrom, 2003; Bollier, 2007). Previously, information and knowledge
would have to be put into tangible form, for example, a book, to allow others to use it. In this form it has
high subtractability: by owning a book you prevent someone else owning that copy of the book, and the
supply of books is limited by the publisher. This meant that information and knowledge goods were either
common-pool or private goods depending on whether they were distributed by a library (difﬁcult exclusion)
or sold (easy exclusion). In digital form, however, these goods can be freely copied for negligible cost. They
are inﬁnite and undepletable (Bollier, 2007). Therefore, these goods would count as either public goods or
club goods.
In the context of information and knowledge as goods, copyright law enables exclusion to be controlled
by the information or knowledge creator. This allows a book to simultaneously be a private good—when
purchased by an individual—and part of a CPR—when made available by a library. Digital information
has gained the same ﬂexibility, both through the protection of the law, but also through technological
means via access-control and digital rights management (Lessig, 2004). Wikipedia provides a public
knowledge resource, having chosen to not have any exclusion, while Journals use pay-walls to exclude
access for those without subscriptions.
Lessig (2004) also shows that copyright law has also been used to artiﬁcially change the subtractability
of digitalised information and knowledge. For example, some publishers have imposed e-book lending
Table 1 Types of goods
Subtractability
Exclusion Low High
Difﬁcult Public goods
Useful knowledge
Sunsets
Common-pool resources
Libraries
Irrigation systems
Easy Toll or club goods
Journal subscriptions
Day-care centres
Private goods
Personal computers
Doughnuts
Hess and Ostrom (2006).
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limits on libraries, preventing too many simultaneous withdrawals. This effectively prevents this knowledge
from becoming a public good, ensuring that library lending remains a CPR.
Therefore, we have a resource which is able to be cast into any of the four goods categories. While
information and knowledge should naturally be a public good, technological and legal control allows the
properties to be changed in order to create a more beneﬁcial good for the creator. Copyright law generally
advocates that creative work should eventually become public goods by falling into the public domain, and
that the protected state of work is purely an incentive mechanism (Samuelson, 2006). The argument for
this is that, because information and knowledge also aid in the creation of new information and knowledge,
having a large public domain will have a cumulative effect and increase overall knowledge as a result. We
reach a dilemma where the knowledge creators wish to exert their control to achieve a short-term beneﬁt
which causes a sub-optimal outcome for all the users of their knowledge, and also their long-term
productivity.
The premise of the information and knowledge commons is that a method of collective action as seen in
past commons literature can be used here in order to tap into the beneﬁts of making information and
knowledge more available (Hess & Ostrom, 2006; Fuster Morell, 2010; Shadbolt, 2013). Ostrom and Hess
(2007) analysed the knowledge commons in the same way as physical commons: using the IAD
framework.
The creation of an institution in order to manage knowledge and information in practical scenarios is
certainly non-trivial. There is a problem of supply (Ostrom, 1990: 42)—that someone must provide the
initial organisational structure and institutional rules—and, as we will see in the next section, there is a ﬁne
line between the emergence of centralised or collective governance. Rules which satisfy Ostrom’s eight
principles are often very speciﬁc to the resource characteristics so we do not have a pre-existing ‘library’ of
rules available when looking to ‘supply’ an institution with which to manage a new resource. The difﬁculty
of implementing effective collective governance structures is arguably a contributing factor to why in many
cases initiators decide to follow Hardin’s advice—privatisation seems to be the only way.
2.3 Application to participatory sensing
Ostrom provides an approach for preventing the tragedy of the commons in social systems using rules
interpreted and acted upon by human actors. In order to use this approach for the kind of large-scale multi-
user content-creation applications seen in participatory sensing we need to reconcile this information and
knowledge with that of the information and knowledge commons. Furthermore, as we are working in a
purely digital domain with high rates of interaction, we should put our institutional rules into digital form
too. This will enable both human and computational participants to interact with the rules as well as the
capability to handle a greater speed and quantity of actions than a social system could.
Participatory sensing deals with the creation of sensor networks from user devices (Burke et al., 2006).
It tasks large numbers of independent individuals to contribute information to a central pool. This infor-
mation is then aggregated and analysed to generate new, valuable information and knowledge.
We can view this pool of information which is generated, as a commons. It is a collection of information
contributed by a large number of independent actors. The value of the pool is cumulative, in that additional
contributions to the pool increase its value. Thus, this CPR has the properties required to be considered an
information commons (Bollier, 2007).
Furthermore, we can consider the knowledge required to aggregate and analyse the information pool
gathered by sensing. This can also be seen as a resource which could be shared with others to reduce the
data processing burden on an individual, or just to share knowledge for others to improve upon. While not
currently common in participatory-sensing applications, some platforms do accommodate contributions of
analytical algorithms (Kansal et al., 2007). Thus, if knowledge is contributed to the participatory-sensing
commons then we can also consider it a knowledge commons.
Therefore, the information and knowledge collected and generated by participatory-sensing applica-
tions can be seen as an information and knowledge commons. This commons can be managed by an
institution of human actors. However, in many cases it can be desirable to be able to transfer this task to
computational agents. For example, in situations where decisions must be made quickly, frequently and
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repeatedly, a computational agent is likely to be much better suited to this role—Wikipedia allow the use
of bots2 for many such tasks such as detecting and reversing malicious edits and checking for copyright
violations. In socio-technical systems there are both human and computational actors, so there needs to be
some kind of common interface within which they can interact. In addition, there are purely computational
domains where we may beneﬁt from these institutions which aim to balance the needs of multiple,
conﬂicting stakeholder positions. For these domains we use an electronic institution, which can be con-
sidered to be a computational analogue of Ostrom’s informal deﬁnition of an institution as “a set of
working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are
allowed or constrained, … [and] contain prescriptions that forbid, permit, or require some action or
outcome” (Ostrom, 1990: 51). The institution is intended to enable agents to interact in order to achieve
both individual and collective goals by regulating and constraining their behaviour, voluntarily, according
to a set of conventional rules.
In this context, Ostrom’s work dealing with social systems has been translated to electronic institutions,
principally by formalising the deﬁnition in computational logic and, critically, extending it with the use of
institutionalised power (Jones & Sergot, 1996) for the formal representation of permitted, forbidden and
obliged actions. Effectively, we are axiomatising Ostrom’s principles for computational agents (Pitt et al.,
2012) such that agents can understand institutional rules and choose whether or not to abide by them.
These formalisations are a form of algorithmic governance, translating the written rules and protocols from
social systems into axioms and algorithms which agents can understand and a computer can execute.
Therefore, by using electronic institutions for algorithmic governance according to Ostrom’s principles
for enduring institutions, we can create sustainable organisations and communities around participatory
sensing.
3 Participatory sensing and the knowledge commons
Having outlined the theoretical case for self-organising governance of participatory sensing as a knowledge
commons, this section presents a review of existing participatory-sensing applications in order to assess the
current approach to governance models. We outline a set of criteria which we use to evaluate a representative
sample of both experimental applications from the literature and commercial applications leveraging parti-
cipatory sensing in their product. We also look at two socio-technical systems dealing with information and
knowledge as an example of effective self-organising management of such a resource.
There are two other relevant surveys on participatory-sensing applications. Christin et al. (2011)
surveys privacy in 30 sensing applications. The survey identiﬁes privacy threats by looking at what is
sensed and the granularity of the sensing in each application. Tilak (2013) performs a simple survey of the
domains of several applications and the hardware and software tools used for sensing. This survey differs
from these, in that our focus is on the organisational structures and where beneﬁts are accrued in each
application.
3.1 Evaluative criteria for participatory sensing
Our survey criteria assess three distinct points in the sensing process: what information ﬂows into the
system and how; how information is managed inside the system; and what beneﬁts are generated by the
system and who can access them. The aim is to determine the ﬂow of value (in the form of information and
knowledge) into and out of the system, and if and how users are incentivised to contribute to and sustain
the system.
We classify information ﬂowing into the application in two ways. First, by the source of the infor-
mation. It can be people centric, collecting information about the user, or environment centric, capturing
information about the participants’ surroundings (Kanhere, 2013). The latter is public information, any
other user could gather the same data by being in the same physical location (or equivalent). Second, we
look at how the data is gathered. This can be explicitly contributed or implicitly gathered (Shadbolt, 2013).
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Bots
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Most participatory sensing is explicit—the user knows that they are contributing information. However,
increasingly information is being gathered implicitly, often without user knowledge.
The management of information is dictated by the organisational structure of the system, both technical
(the architecture) and social (governance). A sensing system’s architecture and governance combine to
specify where the power and assets lie in a system. A centralised governance will mean that a small
number of actors have control over the system and the rules all users must adhere to. Less-centralised
governance methods will spread this power around and possibly require consensus for rule changes and/or
elected positions. A centralised architecture is one where all data is aggregated under one entity’s control.
While this is often a practical solution to data aggregation, it gives this individual power through control of
the core assets of the system. Effective governance is required to limit these powers. The architecture can
also be decentralised, for example, using peer-to-peer (p2p) technologies. This can have a limiting effect
on the governance of a system as there is no single point where control can be applied.
We classify the beneﬁts of a participatory-sensing application on two factors: who they are beneﬁcial
for and who can access them. An output beneﬁt from an application can either be personal—tailored to an
individual based on the information they have contributed—or community—aggregated information
useful to everyone on the given task. Access to beneﬁts can be public or private, which denote whether
some kind of membership is required to receive beneﬁts.
In total we have six criteria:
∙ information source: environment or people;
∙ gathering method: explicit or implicit;
∙ governance: centralised or community;
∙ architecture: centralised server or p2p;
∙ beneﬁts: personal and/or community; and
∙ access: private and/or public.
3.2 Review of participatory-sensing applications
We took a sample of experimental applications from the literature covering multiple domains including
environment monitoring, trafﬁc management and price comparison. The reviewed applications are as follows:
∙ The Pothole Patrol system (Eriksson et al., 2008) uses vibration and GPS data from participating
vehicles to detect road surface conditions.
∙ CenceMe (Miluzzo et al., 2008) is a mobile phone application which attempts to infer the current
context of the user from the device’s sensors as well as neighbouring devices’ sensors.
∙ The LiveCompare (Deng & Cox, 2009) phone application users contribute pictures of grocery products’
price tags which are analysed to create a price matching service.
∙ VTrack (Thiagarajan et al., 2009) collects location information from smartphones in order to provide
travel time estimation for drivers.
∙ In Parknet (Mathur et al., 2010) vehicles monitor for available road-side parking spaces which is then
aggregated to provide real-time parking availability over a city-wide area to various third parties.
∙ VibN (Miluzzo et al., 2011) gathers smartphone sensor data to identify events in a city in real time.
∙ P-Sense (Mendez et al., 2011) measures air pollution from smartphones to generate pollution maps of
the local area.
∙ Cloud2Bubble (Costa et al., 2012) collects data on ambient conditions on public transport from
smartphones and suggests to users changes that they can make to their journey to give themselves a
better quality of experience.
∙ Gas-Mobile (Hasenfratz et al., 2012) uses low-cost sensors connected to smartphones to measure air
pollution levels.
Each application was evaluated according to our given criteria. The results are shown in the ‘Experimental
applications’ section of Table 2.
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Table 2 Survey of participatory-sensing applications
Application Source Method Governance Architecture Beneﬁts Access
Experimental applications
Pothole Patrol (Eriksson et al., 2008) Environment Explicit — Centralised Community and personal —
CenceMe (Miluzzo et al., 2008) People Explicit — Centralised Personal Private (app)
LiveCompare (Deng & Cox, 2009) Environment Explicit — Centralised Community Private
VTrack (Thiagarajan et al., 2009) Environment Explicit — Centralised Personal Private
Parknet (Mathur et al., 2010) Environment Explicit — — Community —
VibN (Miluzzo et al., 2011) Environment Explicit — Centralised Community —
P-Sense (Mendez et al., 2011) Environment Explicit — Hybrid Community —
Cloud2Bubble (Costa et al., 2012) Environment Implicit — Centralised Personal Private (app)
Gas-Mobile (Hasenfratz et al., 2012) Environment Explicit — p2p Community —
Commercial applications
Waze Environment Implicit and explicit Centralised Centralised Community Public and private (app)
OpenSignal Environment Explicit Centralised Centralised Community Public
Social systems
Wikipedia N/A Explicit Community Centralised Community Public
F/OSS N/A Explicit Community Centralised and p2p Community and personal Public and private
p2p, peer-to-peer; F/OSS, free/open-source software.
When a classiﬁcation cannot be made on a criterion due to lack of available information we mark it as not speciﬁed (denoted by—).
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The reviewed papers all follow a similar methodology. Each one identiﬁes a domain to which
participatory sensing can be applied, determines a method for gathering appropriate data from users,
develops an algorithm for producing useful analytics from the data set and deploys a small test application
to verify the method. Under this method there is no need to consider how to incentivise participation in
the application via fair governance and access to beneﬁts. We made the following observations from
our survey:
∙ Data gathering is almost always explicit. Users are recruited speciﬁcally for the purpose of the sensing
campaign.
∙ Governance is not considered in any case. In deployed applications it is assumed that the institution has
complete control over the application with no oversight.
∙ Architectures are mostly centralised. This is the simplest way to deploy such a system when scaling is
not a requirement. In some cases the authors considered scaling, and thus architectures which utilised
some p2p technologies were used (Mendez et al., 2011; Hasenfratz et al., 2012).
∙ Access to the system’s beneﬁts is only speciﬁed in four cases, and this access is always private,
requiring certain membership or ownership of an app. As the authors’ aims were generally to show that
the proposed algorithms generate correct inferences from the sensors then access to this data for users
was not considered in many cases.
To see how participatory sensing is deployed in real-world scenarios we extended the survey to two
commercial applications, Waze3 and OpenSignal4. Waze is a smartphone application which provides car
navigation information to the user as well as alerts about hazards which may affect users’ journeys.
Information is sent back while the app is in use to track the speed of certain routes and trafﬁc levels. Users
may also actively report events which affect their progress, such as accidents or ﬂooding. Waze uses this
information to ﬁrst build a map of possible driving routes and detect new roads, and second to provide
optimal routing to users with accurate arrival predictions. OpenSignal aggregates information on mobile
phone signal quality from user devices in order to generate maps of the quality of service available under
each provider across the world.
The survey of these applications is shown in Table 2 (‘Commercial applications’ section). In both cases
a central governance is used. The companies control any changes to policies governing the data they hold
and access to it. The applications differ in how data are collected and beneﬁts accessed. OpenSignal is
explicit about data gathering—the sole purpose of their app is the gathering of signal strength data. Their
aggregated data set is then made open to the public via their websites and publications. Therefore, this
application does not provide incentives for users to participate in the gathering effort beyond some
personal stats on their own gathered data. Waze, on the other hand, hides its data gathering behind the
app’s functionality as a satellite navigation tool. While the app is performing navigation for the user, data
is fed back to Waze in order to improve the navigation performance. Through its design the app implicitly
enforces a reciprocal relationship where information on trafﬁc and road conditions is exchanged for
optimised travel directions. The app encourages additional explicit contributions in the form of tagging
roadwork locations, etc., which is then provided to other users to alert them about hazards or to improve
routing. While access to the real-time travel map is made publicly available through the Waze website, it
does not provide the navigation available in the app. Therefore, the application sustains itself simply by
providing accurate navigation via the app which in turn causes users to implicitly contribute information to
improve the service.
From this review we draw two main conclusions. First, that the current work on participatory sensing
focuses on the provision of sensing campaigns and algorithms for the processing of data for those
campaigns. Second, where governance and infrastructure has been provisioned for large-scale, long
running participatory-sensing deployments it tends to be centralised. The fact that centralised governance
is provisioned should not be a surprise. For the organisations involved it satisﬁes a self-interested strategy,
3 http://www.waze.com
4 http://opensignal.com
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which is also an effective one in terms of return on investment and/or proﬁt. This governance choice does
not seem to hinder the operation of the system as users can be incentivised to contribute.
3.3 Extension to knowledge commons
To assess possible alternatives to centralised governance of participatory-sensing systems we extend our
survey to a particular kind of social system which is accessed and controlled via the Internet. These
systems involve large numbers of participants and contributors, who access and build on the information
and knowledge in a shared resource. They can be seen as knowledge commons. We look at two examples:
Wikipedia5 and Free/open-source software6 (FOSS). Wikipedia is an example of a very successful
deployment of community governance which has created a knowledge commons which is arguably richer
than what could be produced through other means. In FOSS we have a general framework which has
enabled anyone in the world to create and contribute to software which can compete with commercial
products, and also give free and libre7 access to this software. We can test both of these systems against the
same criteria we have used previously, and the results are again in Table 2 (‘Social systems’ section).
Under our survey criteria, Wikipedia is classiﬁed as gathering information explicitly. Contributions are
new articles, modiﬁcations to existing ones or moderations of others’ submissions, and therefore users
generating this content are aware that they are provisioning it to Wikipedia. The result of these con-
tributions is a knowledge resource which is available to anyone, and no speciﬁc rewards are reserved
to encourage editing or moderation actions. While its architecture is centralised under one website,
Wikipedia has a complex community governance which allows policies on the site to change, provided
consensus is behind the change. This governance has developed over time to become more open in
response to criticism and concerns over possible involvement from commercial organisations (Fuster
Morell, 2011). The need for dynamic governance is in part driven by the permissive licence given to
content on the site, which allows anyone to publish the content elsewhere, and has in the past let to the
forking of whole sections to separate sites (Famiglietti, 2011).
Like Wikipedia, contributions to FOSS are explicit. Contributions take the form of code commits, code
review, bug reporting, mailing-list discussion and general project administration. There are some cases of
open-source software which gather anonymised usage information, a process which would count as
implicit information gathering, however, currently this is quite rare (although increasingly common
in commercial software). The governance of FOSS projects tends to be informal and dynamic (Schweik,
2007). In addition, as the FOSS community has matured, tools for both the administration of source
code (code repositories, bug trackers, etc.) and the administration of project governance (mailing
lists, discussion forums, etc.) have been developed. The availability of these tools is generally free and
commoditised to such an extent that creating the infrastructure for a new FOSS project can be done at zero
monetary cost8.
For both Wikipedia and FOSS, work analyses have been done with respect to Ostrom’s framework.
Forte et al. (2009) describe how Wikipedia’s governance conforms to Ostrom’s eight principles. Schweik
(2007) uses the IAD analysis on FOSS. The innovation of Copyleft (Stallman, 1999), which allows the
creation of code licensed under this regime to be considered as a public good, is credited as being a key
rule-in-use in FOSS by legally binding works into the commons and keeping them there. It offers a middle
ground between the copyright extremes of ‘all rights reserved’ and public domain. Schweik (2007) also
advocates that the FOSS collaborative paradigm can be applied to any collaboration around intellectual
property. These two examples show that successful systems have been built to develop and manage shared
resources of information and knowledge using decentralised, community governance. Like in physical
5 http://www.wikipedia.org
6 Software which is free and open source, as advocated by the Free Software Foundation (http://www.fsf.org),
amongst others.
7 In the context of open-source software these terms are used to describe two different meanings of ‘free’: ‘for zero
price’ and ‘with little or no restriction’ (libre).
8 Sites such as http://sourceforge.net and https://github.com provide a full suite of tools for free to projects licensed
under FOSS licenses.
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commons the governance system can be shown to conform to Ostrom’s principles, and further analysis can
identify some particular features which contribute to their success.
3.4 Summary
From our survey of participatory-sensing applications we have identiﬁed several issues. First, a lack of
governance consideration. This led to a review of the governance that does exist in commercial applica-
tions. Our observation is that the high cost of provisioning a participatory-sensing application under the
current paradigm contributed to a centralised governance which seeks to achieve a return on investment.
Finally, we looked at social systems for managing knowledge commons which have been shown to
conform to Ostrom’s design principles to sustain and develop a rich commons of knowledge, as well as a
framework which enables very cheap and easy provision of infrastructure and governance for information
and knowledge commons. This is the motivation for specifying a system which uses a collective governance
model for participatory sensing, as presented in the next section.
4 A commons for participatory sensing
We have seen how information and knowledge can be treated as a commons, and some examples where
collective governance has been supplied for this purpose. In this section we propose an architecture for
provision and appropriation of information and knowledge for participatory sensing and analyse it, using
the IAD framework (Ostrom, 2005), as an information and knowledge commons.We then specify a formal
system for participatory sensing using this architecture, show how it can accommodate Ostrom’s princi-
ples and evaluate the expected outcomes of such an institution according to the evaluative criteria of the
IAD. Finally, we consider how formal system can provide a library of rules which can be instantiated in
order to ‘supply’ an institution.
In order to deﬁne a participatory-sensing application, we take a set of four general user roles, as deﬁned
by Burke et al. (2006), and add a ﬁfth role. These roles are:
∙ initiators, who initiate the application and form an organisation around it;
∙ gatherers, users who participate in the information gathering and provision it;
∙ evaluators, who verify and classify received information;
∙ analysts, who process the information to create conclusions on the data, often in the form of new
information and/or knowledge; and
∙ consumers who demand the derived, or second-order, information and knowledge.
We consider a ‘role’ in this context to be an institutionally assigned label to denote what is expected and/or
permitted for a user to do. Note that user roles are not mutually exclusive and a user may occupy many
roles simultaneously within one institution. For example, in a large proportion of cases gatherers are also
consumers, and in fact their compensation for their gathering efforts is the right to consume. Equally,
initiators often are evaluators and analysts too. Therefore, the model allows appropriation of knowledge
by a user occupying the role of consumer, if that user also occupies the role of analyst. The formulation of
role in this section speciﬁcally allows agents to occupy multiple roles in the same institution, and indeed
different roles in different institutions.
We consider this participatory-sensing application in the form of a provision and appropriation system,
where the resources being provisioned and appropriated are information and knowledge. Figure 1 illustrates
such a system and how each role interacts with the resource. Four boxes represent user roles interacting with
the resource. Some roles will require additional agent internals, such as gatherers requiring appropriate
sensors and analysts requiring knowledge to aggregate sensor information. Arrows represent movement of
information and knowledge; dotted arrows represent optional actions.
The IAD framework can be used to analyse such a system, develop it and evaluate it. The IAD is split into
nine areas of analysis (Figure 2). The left side of the framework looks at what the resource and the community
using it is like, and rules which have been created for resource and institution management. The middle
section deals with where interactions occur and who these interactions are between. The right-hand side
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observes what the outcomes are and evaluates them. Our use of the IAD in the section is split into three
parts. First, we provide an analysis of a participatory-sensing system using the left-hand side of the
framework, looking at resource and community characteristics and rules-in-use. Second, we propose a
new set of rules-in-use to address each of Ostrom’s principles for sustainable institutions. Finally, we use
the observational and evaluative aspects on the right of the IAD framework to evaluate our proposed
system. The ﬁnal part of this section addresses the issue of supply of such an institution.
4.1 IAD analysis
We now present an analysis of participatory sensing as a provision and appropriation system. Following
the IAD framework we discuss the characteristics of the information and knowledge gathered through
sensing as a resource (bio-physical characteristics), the community of individual actors involved in
the sensing process (attributes of the community), and how institutional rules are, or could be, created
(rules-in-use).
ACTION 
ARENA
Attributes of 
the
Community
Evaluative 
CriteriaActors
Action 
Situations
Outcomes
Patterns of 
Interactions
Rules-in-Use 
Bio-Physical
Characteristics
Figure 2 Institutional analysis and development framework (Ostrom & Hess, 2007: 44)
Facilities
Information Knowledge
Gatherer
Sensor
provision
Consumer
appropriate
Analyst
Knowledgeprovision &
appropriate 
provision &
appropriate 
provision &
appropriate 
provision &
appropriate 
Evaluator
Knowledge
Figure 1 Participatory sensing as a provision and appropriation system. Dotted arrows represent optional actions
for that role
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4.1.1 Bio-physical characteristics
Typically this area is concerned with the physical attributes of the resource, in terms of ﬂow and facility.
This distinction separates the resource units (ﬂow) from where they are stored and generated (facility). In
order to deal with the complexity of information and knowledge Hess and Ostrom (2003) put forward an
alternative method, considering ideas, artefacts and facilities. In this framework, ideas are data, infor-
mation and knowledge in intangible form; artefacts are the expression of ideas into tangible, observable
form; facilities store artefacts and make them available. As intangible objects, ideas, by deﬁnition, cannot
be represented within a computational system—they must be expressed into ﬁles, databases or algorithms
to be used. In this form they are then artefacts. Therefore, we treat ideas as a resource ﬂow external to the
system, and instead manage the tangible derivative works from them: artefacts.
In participatory sensing, the artefacts are raw sensor data, contextualised sensor information, algo-
rithms for the analysis of data and rich information generated from these algorithms. Some of these
artefacts will be protected by copyright law, and this will affect what control the organisation is able to
have over them. The status of data and information (as we have deﬁned them) with regards to copyright is
currently ambiguous, traditionally it was not copyrightable, however, databases are copyrightable (Miller
et al., 2008). This copyright protection is important as it affects how easily the organisation can protect its
assets. Bad protection limits the ability of the organisation to prevent forks of the information. This will
affect the excludability of the artefacts, as, while one may be able to exclude access to one database, if the
information can be freely copied elsewhere then this control is lost. It has become prevalent in the age of
digital information that when individuals feel there will be no or little chance of punishment for sharing
information, they do so on a large scale (Lessig, 2004: 62–66).
The facilities constitute how the data, information and knowledge are stored. A suitable facility depends
on the properties of the resource (e.g. where this storage is physically located, i.e. under whose control it is)
and who is willing to underwrite its costs. In existing participatory-sensing applications the initiator,
evaluators and/or analysts provide this infrastructure and pay for it. Alternatives would be distributed or
p2p databases where a set of individuals cooperatively provide infrastructure and bear that cost (perhaps
being compensated by those who cannot contribute). A p2p system could be one where each individual
looks after their own data and responds to requests for it (cf. Global Sensor Network (GSN) (Aberer et al.,
2006) and Open Mustard Seed (OMS)9), or a robust replicated system where every user has a copy of the
whole data set (cf. decentralised version-control system Git10 and crypto-currency Bitcoin11) or anywhere
between these extremes. We may also have different facilities for different artefact types within a single
organisation if the artefact quantity and transitivity differ.
We can furthermore consider computational resources as facilities. Evaluators and analysts use their
knowledge (i.e. algorithms) with the information stored in the facility to generate new information. This
process requires computational resources which are provided by the evaluator or analyst themselves.
Alternatively, participants could provision resources or share cost for this computation. The commodiﬁcation
of computational resources makes this very easy to achieve in practice.
4.1.2 Attributes of the community
To identify the community for the knowledge commons, Ostrom and Hess (2007) begin by assessing infor-
mation users, information providers and information policymakers. Users appropriate information, providers
constitute both providers of artefacts and facilities, and policymakers are those who partake in the organisational
governance. Each of these groups contain multiple sub-groups, each with different interests and agendas.
The users in participatory sensing are those appropriating information in order to apply knowledge to
it (evaluators and analysts) and those appropriating this derived data (consumers). As in many cases
consumers are also providers as they have a reciprocal relationship with the analysts.
Providers constitute the users providing sensor information (providers), users providing both
information derived from knowledge and/or the knowledge itself (evaluators and analysts), and users
9 http://idcubed.org/open-platform/platform/
10 http://git-scm.com
11 http://bitcoin.org
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providing infrastructure for facilities. This is a diverse group which is likely to involve almost all users in
the application. However, it is also one of the most critical groups, as a lack of provision will be a key
factor in the success or failure of the organisation. Big data has shown us that the value of information is
additive, often exponentially so, and gaining traction—a critical mass of providers—is important. We have
seen in Section 3 some methods for incentivising contribution.
Finally, policymakers constitute a more diverse and abstract group of community decisionmakers. Any
user or provider can be a policymaker, but equally, membership of those groups is not a requirement.
Currently, many participatory-sensing applications have a very small number of predeﬁned policymakers,
and this is in direct violation of Ostrom’s third principle—that those affected by the rules can participate in
their modiﬁcation. Therefore, we would like to see larger groups of decisionmakers like in Wikipedia and
FOSS. This does not mean that all policymakers will have equal power (in terms of capability to enact
change), however, policy-making communities can be nested, as we see in social communities and the
systems reviewed in Section 3.
4.1.3 Rules-in-use
The rules-in-use dictate what users must, must not or may do in an organisation. The IAD breaks these
rules down into three levels: operational, collective-choice and constitutional. Operational rules deal with
day-to-day operations regarding the resource, who can provision and appropriate what and when.
Collective-choice rules determine how operational rules can be changed, and constitutional rules deter-
mine who can participate in collective-choice decisions and how collective-choice rules can be changed.
For a knowledge commons Ostrom and Hess (2007) advocate the creation of rules by allocating
bundles of property rights, a method which has also been adopted for the Creative Commons licenses12.
Seven rights were identiﬁed (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992):
∙ Access: the right to enter an area and enjoy non-subtractive beneﬁts. Typically, this right would be for
physical access to the property, though this concept can be extended to information commons. In
participatory sensing, access would grant the ability to browse or search the repository, but not to extract
anything. This can be likened to browsing a library without the right to loan anything.
∙ Contribution: the right to contribute artefacts to the repository, or right of provision. This can be
discriminated by the type of information/knowledge being contributed.
∙ Extraction: the right to obtain artefacts, or right of appropriation. As with contribution this could be
discriminated by information/knowledge type, for example, only certain experts may be allowed to
extract sensor information, but everyone can extract the information generated by these experts.
∙ Removal: the right to remove one’s artefacts from the resource.
∙ Management/participation: ‘The right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by
making improvements’ (Ostrom & Hess, 2007: 52). The ﬁrst part of this right is a collective-choice
right, but the second part is also applied at the operational level. Management of the resource could
involve pruning, aggregating or compressing information in order to keep facility costs down.
∙ Exclusion: ‘The right to determine who will have access, contribution, extraction and removal rights
and how those rights may be transferred’ (Ostrom & Hess, 2007: 53). This is a collective-choice right
which controls the level of access for users of the resource.
∙ Alienation: ‘The right to sell or lease extraction, management/participation, and exclusion rights’
(Ostrom & Hess, 2007: 53). In this deﬁnition the sale of a right prohibits the seller from utilising that
right once it is transferred. Therefore, it is not a right which is particularly applicable to information
commons.
With these rights we can make rules to describe the operational and most of the collective-choice levels
of many organisations managing information and knowledge. Rights give users the institutional power,
permission and/or obligation to take actions within the context of a knowledge commons. We can formalise
12 http://creativecommons.org
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these relationships to write rules which are machine readable, such that agents can understand when they are
permitted or obliged to perform actions, and when someone has broken the rules (Artikis, 2011).
4.2 Formal characterisation
Having analysed participatory sensing as a knowledge commons, we can now begin to formally char-
acterise such a system. Pitt et al. (2012) used the event calculus (EC) (Kowalski & Sergot, 1986) and
institutionalised power (Jones & Sergot, 1996) to formally characterise a resource-allocation system and
address six of Ostrom’s (1990) eight principles. We follow the same methodology, applying it instead to a
provision and appropriation system with multiple resource types.
Figure 3 illustrates the participatory-sensing provision and appropriation system with multiple levels
of information and knowledge. The same actions, provision and appropriate, can be used for several
different resource types. In addition to those shown in the diagram, facilities and institutions can be
provisioned. We assume that we are able to distinguish between each of these resource types and thus
tailor rules. In our representation we use simple predicates to make these distinctions.
4.2.1 The EC and institutionalised power
For this formalisation we wish to use a language which is able to represent and reason about action,
agency, social constraints and change. We continue with the EC, as we have extended the speciﬁcation
from Pitt et al. (2012). In addition, its clarity of exposition and executable speciﬁcation are useful for
this task.
The EC is a logical formalism for representing and reasoning about actions or events and their effects,
based on a many-sorted ﬁrst-order predicate calculus. An EC speciﬁcation consists of an action description
which includes axioms that deﬁne: action occurrences, using happensAt predicates; the effects of actions,
using initiates and terminates predicates; and the values of ﬂuents, using initially and holdsAt predicates.
Table 3 summarises EC predicates which we use in our speciﬁcation. Variables start with an uppercase letter
Facilities
Sensor 
Information
Evaluative 
Knowledge
provision
Consumer
appropriate
appropriate
provision & 
appropriate
provision & 
appropriate
Meta 
Information
Analytic  
Knowledge
Derived 
Information
provision
appropriate
provision
Gatherer
Sensor
Analyst
Knowledge
Evaluator
Knowledge
Figure 3 Participatory sensing as a provision and appropriation system with multiple types of information and
knowledge. Raw information from sensors is provisioned then knowledge is used to generate multiple different
types of information from this. Dotted arrows represent optional actions for that role
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and are assumed to be universally quantiﬁed. Note that the underscore ‘_’ denotes the anonymous variable
which can stand for (be uniﬁed with) any value. Predicates, function symbols and constants start with a
lowercase letter. Fluents are properties which can have different values at different points in time.
In order to represent and reason about permissions and access control within an institution we need a
formalisation of institutionalised power (Jones & Sergot, 1996). This term refers to the feature of insti-
tutions whereby designated agents, often acting in speciﬁc roles, are empowered, obliged or permitted to
perform certain actions which in turn may modify certain institutional facts. In EC we formalise these
powers as ﬂuents which indicate whether an agent has or had a speciﬁc power at a time.
4.2.2 Addressing Ostrom’s principles
Pitt et al. (2012) demonstrated that six of Ostrom’s principles could be axiomatised for a resource-allocation
problem. There are several differences between this problem and our provision and appropriation system.
Therefore, we follow the same methodology but modify the axioms where appropriate. In resource-
allocation systems there is a physical resource which is accessed through appropriations, while in our case
the agents interact with provisions as well as appropriations. In addition, resource allocation deals with
scarce, highly excludable resources, meaning that one agent’s appropriation excludes another agent from
doing the same. In the case of information and knowledge, a key feature which we identiﬁed in Section 2, is
the lack of scarcity and excludability.
The formal characterisation consists of a set of actions which agents can perform in the action arena of
the participatory-sensing application, a set of ﬂuents which describe the state of the system at discrete time
points, and rules which describe how the agents’ actions affect the ﬂuents. Through this characterisation
we enumerate how certain rules can satisfy some of Ostrom’s principles, and may lead to certain outcomes.
The rules are sourced from both social systems that we have reviewed and from technical solutions which
are available for the virtual domain. Table 4 lists agent actions, Table 5 lists ﬂuents and Table 6 lists the
predicates and function symbols.
Table 4 Agent actions
Action Description
provision(A, I, Obj) Agent A provisions object Obj to institution I
appropriate(A, I, Obj) Agent A appropriates object Obj from institution I
apply(A, I, Role) Agent A applies for the role Role in institution I
assign(G, A, I, Role) Gatekeeper agent G assigns the role of Role in institution I to agent A
report(M, A, I, Reason) Monitor agent M reports agent A in institution I for the reason given by Reason
appeal(A, I, S) Agent A appeals the sanction level S in institution I
uphold(C, A, I, S) Head agent C upholds the appeal by agent A for the sanction level S in institution I
Table 3 Main predicates of the event calculus
Predicate Meaning
Act happensAt T Action Act occurs at time T
Initially F = V The value of ﬂuent F is V at time 0
F = V holdsAt T The value of ﬂuent F is V at time T
Act initiates F = V at T The occurrence of action Act at time T initiates a period of time for which the
value of ﬂuent F is V
Act terminates F = V at T The occurrence of action Act at time T terminates a period of time for which the
value of ﬂuent F is V
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Principle 1: clearly deﬁned boundaries
Deﬁning boundaries for a digital resource is much easier than with physical resources. First, the
resource facility is not a pre-existing physical area, it is a virtual portal where the information and knowledge
are stored. Access to the resource is much easier to control due to the availability of authentication
mechanisms (e.g. public key infrastructure, identity management, etc.) which allow the veriﬁcation of users
accessing the resource. Taking open-source software as an example, the facilities (the version-control
Table 6 Predicate/function symbols
Predicate/function Values/range Description
type(Obj) {sensor_information,
derived_information,
meta_information,
analytic_knowledge,
evaluative_knowledge}
Determines the artefact type of Obj
countAppropriations(A, I, R, T1, T2) Integer Counts the number of appropriations by
agent A of resources of type R in
institution I between times T1 and T2
countProvisions(A, I, R, T1, T2) Integer Counts the number of provisions by
agent A of resources of type R in
institution I between times T1 and T2
derivedFrom(S, Alg, O) Boolean true iff artefact O was derived from
artefact S using Alg
Table 5 Fluents
Fluent Values Description
role_of(A, I, Role) Boolean true iff agent A has the role of Role in institution I
provided(A, I, Obj) Boolean true iff agent A successfully provisioned Obj to institution I
appropriated(A, I, Obj) Boolean true iff agent A successfully appropriatedObj from institution I
applied(A, I, Role) Boolean true iff agent A successfully made an application for the role
Role in institution I
acMethod(I, Role) {none, attribute,
discretionary, vote}
Speciﬁes the access-control method for the role Role in
institution I
appLimit(I, Role, Rtype) (Integer, time) The current rate limit on appropriations of the resource type
Rtype for the role Role in institution I. Value is a two-tuple of
number of appropriations over a discrete time period
review_score(A, I ) [0…1] A rating of the agent A’s provisions to the institution I
score_threshold( I ) [0…1] The threshold of provision quality required by the institution I
appealed(A, I, S) Boolean true iff agent A has made an appeal over the sanction level S in
institution I
sanction_level(A, I ) Integer The current sanction level of agent A in institution I
offences(A, I) Integer The number of offences committed by agent A in institution I
adrMethod(I ) {arbitration, mediation,
negotiation, …}
Speciﬁes the dispute resolution method used in institution I
licenceReq(I) {none, copyleft,…} Speciﬁes the required licence for artefacts in institution I
licence(Obj) {none, copyleft,…} Gives the current licence type of artefact Obj
pow(A, Action) Boolean Agent A has the institutionalised power to perform action
Action
per(A, Action) Boolean Agent A has the institutionalised permission to perform action
Action
obl(A, Action) Boolean Agent A is obliged to perform action Action
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system, bug/issue tracker and mailing list) have ﬁne-grained access control, preventing unauthorised
access to the resource.
This access control can be implemented in a distributed system using a role-based system. In addition to
the operational user roles for participatory sensing we add roles for institutional tasks, in this case an agent
with the role of gatekeeper. This role empowers this agent to assign roles according to the speciﬁed access-
control method for the institution. An agent who applies for a role can be subsequently assigned to the role
by the gatekeeper, provided the conditions of entry for the chosen access-control method are satisﬁed.
apply(A, I, Role) initiates applied(A, I, Role) = true at T←
pow(A, apply(A, I, Role)) = true holdsAt T
pow (A, apply(A, I, Role)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of(A, I, Role) = false holdsAt T
assign(G, A, I, Role) initiates role_of(A, I, Role) = true at T ←
pow(G, assign(G, A, I, Role)) = true holdsAt T
pow(G, assign(G, A, I, Role)) = true holdsAt T ←
applied(A, I, Role) = true holdsAt T ∧
acMethod(I, Role) = discretionary holdsAt T ∧
role_of(G, I, gatekeeper) = true holdsAt T
The axioms above give the example of discretionary assignment, where the gatekeeper can decide
whether to assign a role or not. An agent A performing the apply action initiates a period of time during
which the ﬂuent applied(A, I, Role) is true if it is empowered to perform that action; it is empowered to
perform that action if the agent does not already occupy this role. Similarly, an agent G can make the
institutional fact (ﬂuent) true that an agent A is assigned to a role Role if it is empowered to perform the
assign action. This is the case if agent A has applied for the role, agent G occupies the role of gatekeeper
and the access-control method is discretionary.
Note that we could also use attribute-based access control, where the gatekeeper may only assign the
role if the applicant satisﬁes certain conditions. We could allow agents to vote on new applicants, or, if we
want more open access to certain roles, we can compel the gatekeeper to assign a role to all applicants:
obl(G, assign(G, A, I, Role)) = true holdsAt T ←
Role = gatherer ∧
applied(A, I, Role) = true holdsAt T ∧
acMethod(I, Role) = none holdsAt T ∧
role_of(G, I, gatekeeper) = true holdsAt T
Using roles we can deﬁne who will be empowered, that is, have the right, to provision and appropriate
certain resources, according to Figure 3.
pow(A, provision(A, I, Obj)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of(A, I, gatherer) = true holdsAt T ∧
type(Obj) = sensor_information
pow(A, provision(A, I, Obj)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of(A, I, analyst) = true holdsAt T ∧
type(Obj) = derived_information
pow(A, provision(A, I, Obj)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of(A, I, evaluator) = true holdsAt T ∧
type(Obj) = meta_information
The axioms for appropriation have the same structure, simply changing the provision action to
appropriation and the role and resource type where applicable. Figure 3 speciﬁes which roles can
appropriate each resource type.
Principle 2: congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
The appropriation and provision rules must be relevant for the local conditions, and therefore are often
quite application speciﬁc. These rules cover time, place, technology and quantity of resource units
appropriated or provisioned. The principle is typically violated when the rules cause over-regulation of an
abundant resource or under-regulation of a scarce one.
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In participatory sensing, scarcity may arise in access to the resource, for example, through an excessive
quantity of requests going to the facility. One method of dealing with such congestion would be to rate
limit requests. If we take an example of a consumer appropriating road trafﬁc information from the facility,
an incorrectly implemented rate limit could severely limit the usefulness of the resource. As the nature of
resource usage in this case is bursty (large number of requests in one go when route planning, then very
few for a period of time afterwards), a quota system of x requests per minute is extremely more restrictive
than 60 × 24 × x requests per day, despite corresponding to the same overall quota.
Rate limits can be expressed as follows:
pow(A, appropriate(A, I, Obj)) = true holdsAt T←
type(Obj) = Rtype ∧
role_of(A, I, Role) = true holdsAt T ∧
appLimit(I, Role, Rtype) = (Limit, Period) holdsAt T ∧
countAppropriations(A, I, Rtype, T – Period, T)<Limit
In Pitt et al. (2012) this principle is addressed by looking at when it is appropriate to demand resources.
Here, the patterns of interaction are likely to be more free form. However, in some applications we may
want to force a more symmetric relationship to compel agents to contribute to the resource:
pow(A, appropriate(A, I, Obj)) = true holdsAt T ←
countProvisions(A, I, Rtype, 0, T) = P ∧
countAppropriations(A, I, Rtype, 0, T)⩽P
Principle 3: collective-choice arrangements
‘Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules’—
this is certainly not the case in current participatory-sensing applications. To achieve this, a framework is
required to allow users to propose and agree on new rules and rule changes in the context of the application.
Many such frameworks exist for human organisations, and some have been formalised to be usable for agent
systems (Artikis et al., 2005), including robust voting mechanisms (Pitt et al., 2006).
Pitt et al. (2012) formulate a voting mechanism for collective-choice arrangements through effective
enfranchisement of members of the institution. This enfranchisement is achieved by empowering agents to
vote and granting an entitlement associated with this right, ensuring a correct result is declared from a
ballot. This entitlement is implemented as an obligation for a particular agent to declare the result of a vote
according to an agreed-upon winner-determination method. This general voting system is ﬁt for purpose
across many domains, indeed it is just a formalisation of protocols used in many social systems (Pitt et al.,
2006), and so we can adopt it as-is for this domain.
An issue remains, though, of how or whether agents can make reasoned decisions about rules, let alone
create new rules, without human intervention. This problem has been explored with the implementation of
the game of nomic played by agents (Holland et al., 2013). Normative synthesis (Morales et al., 2013)
offers an approach to the generation of rules. We can use the concepts of learning, self-simulation and
self-awareness to provide some reasoning about the consequences of rules.
Principle 4: monitoring
Monitoring can be implemented, provided sufﬁcient auditing capabilities are available (Pitt et al., 2012).
Wikipedia sets a good example here: all users are able to monitor each other through the edit history, which
gives a ﬁne-grained breakdown of what has been contributed and by whom. However, this level of transpar-
ency may seem too much for some, as full visibility of users actions will come with privacy concerns. In
technical systems, this auditing can be done via a log of institutional actions performed by agents. This creates a
narrative, like the ones which can be processedwith the EC, and the process of monitoring is simply looking for
actions which are performed when the actor did not have the permission to perform that action at the time.
Effective monitoring can occur in several different ways. First, some systems can be designed such that
monitoring is a side-effect arising from normal use. Ostrom (1990) observed this in ﬁsheries which
allocated areas of a lake to different individuals on a rota. If an individual, upon arriving in their allotted
zone, found someone else using it they would obviously have detected the violation of the rules and be able
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to report it. Second, individuals can be incentivised to monitor for violations. Unlike in the ﬁrst case this
involves some additional effort on the individual’s part. This incentivisation can be in the form of a reward for
ﬁnding violations or payment for performing audits. Finally, the institution can arrange for an independent
third party to monitor the system, and pay for this by collecting contributions from members.
In the participatory-sensing scenario our access-control procedures provide protection over access to
the resource, therefore monitoring is more concerned with the content of provisions: the quality of
information and knowledge provided, and whether a user is permitted to provision a particular artefact.
These requirements touch on different concepts and thus need to be handled differently.
In the case of the quality of provisioned information and knowledge, the actions of evaluators can be a form
of monitoring. Meta information provisioned by evaluators can provide indications of the trustworthiness and
accuracy of sensor information, derived information and even other meta information (see Figure 3). This
process is akin to review, rating and trust systems seen in e-commerce and other online applications. Provided
that there are evaluators provisioning this kind of information in the institution, this is a form of side-effect
monitoring. Incentives can also be created to encourage more provision of meta information.
We may assign a monitor role to an agent who is required to monitor for low-quality provisions. To do
this, they can simply look for information provisioned by evaluators that suggests an agent’s data is below
some quality threshold. If this is the case, it will trigger a report of that agent (indeed, the monitor may even
be obliged to report the offence):
report(M, A, I, O) initiates monitored_offence(A, I) = O at T ←
pow(M, report(M, A, I, O)) = true holdsAt T
pow(M, report(M,_,I,_)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of(M, I, monitor) = true holdsAt T
obl(M, report(M, A, I, baddata)) = true holdsAt T ←
review_score(A, I) = S holdsAt T ∧
score_threshold(I) = Thres holdsAt T ∧
S< Thres
The other concern, provision of artefacts when the individual does not have the permission to, is more
difﬁcult to monitor. There are two possible malicious actions here which we may want to monitor: an agent
provisioning an artefact which has already been provisioned previously; and an agent provisioning an artefact
which was generated by another, but has not been provisioned to this institution. In both cases the agent acts
maliciously in order to gain beneﬁts of provision without having to generate an artefact legitimately.
However, any open system facing the problem of non-compliant behaviour has to consider the related
problems: how are these actions detectable, and if so, is it even worthwhile to monitor? It has been shown
(e.g. Balke et al., 2013) that the cost of monitoring can outweigh the beneﬁts of preventing or punishing
non-compliant behaviour. This can be particularly acute in any system with endogenous resources, where
the cost of monitoring has to be ‘paid for’ from the same CPR that is itself being monitored.
Principle 5: graduated sanctions
In order to have graduated sanctions, we require multiple levels of punishment. First, as we have control over the
system’s boundaries through access control, we can implement temporary and permanent banishment as possible
sanctions. Second, we can revoke certain provision and/or appropriation rights. Finally, if there exists some form
of micro-payment system, we can levy ﬁnes against members. Therefore, given that we have several forms of
sanction which differ in both context and severity, we should be able to implement graduated sanctions.
Pitt et al. (2012) use a sanction level which increases on each new offence for that agent. At higher
sanction levels a nominated agent (in this case a role of head assumes this responsibility) is empowered
(and may be obliged) to impose stronger sanctions. This method assumes equal weight to each offence,
though we may deﬁne some offences which can cause multiple level increases.
Principle 6: conﬂict-resolution mechanisms
In Ostrom’s work this principle was mainly used to deal with conﬂict due to ambiguities arising from the
way that rules were written. Rules in a computational system (if written correctly) should not have any
ambiguities, so theoretically there should be no need for this principle.
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However, as we have collective-choice arrangements, we have a system which has a rule which
says that the rules should be changeable. Suber (1990) hypothesised that such a system will inevitably
lead to paradox or gaps in the rule set. Given this, the question is whether to give agents recourse to
retrospectively claim for losses due to such issues through conﬂict resolution.
In Pitt et al. (2012) alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is used as a fast, cheap and effective conﬂict-
resolution mechanism. A simple appeals procedure is given, allowing one to appeal sanctions. A more
complete speciﬁcation of an ADR protocol is given in Pitt (2012b). We will simply give an overview of the
semantics of the appeal process, and the method of deciding whether an appeal is valid and should be
upheld. How one argues one’s case is beyond the scope of this work, but there are several approaches to
choose from.
For example, the agent occupying the requisite role (head) is empowered to sanction another agent if an
offence has been reported (see Principle 4), and this action increases the sanction level against this agent.
sanction(H, I, A, O) initiates sanction_level(A, I) = S1 at T ←
pow(H, sanction(H, I, A, O)) = true holdsAt T ∧
sanction_level(A, I) = S holdsAt T ∧
S1 = S+ 1
pow(H, sanction(H, I, A, O)) = true holdsAt T←
role_of(H, I, head) = true holdsAt T ∧
monitored_offence(A, I) = O holdsAt T
An agent may appeal against its sanction level:
appeal(A, I, S) initiates appealed(A, I, S) = true at T ←
pow(A, appeal(A, I, S)) = true holdsAt T
pow(A, appeal(A, I, S)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of(A, I, _) = true holdsAt T ∧
sanction_level(A, I) = S holdsAt T
The head may then lower the sanction level if the appeal is successful. If the ADR method for the
institution is arbitration, then the head agent can decide the outcome of the appeal process itself.
uphold(H, A, I, S) initiates sanction_level(A, I) = S1 at T ←
pow(H, uphold(H, A, I, S)) = true holdsAt T ∧
sanction_level(A, I) = S holdsAt T ∧
S1 = S− 1
pow(H, uphold(H, A, I, S)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of(H, I, head) = true holdsAt T ∧
appealed(A, I, S) = true holdsAt T ∧
adrMethod(I) = arbitration holdsAt T
An appeal which is upheld could also initiate review and retraction of the monitored offence (axioms
not speciﬁed here).
Principle 7: minimal recognition of rights to organise
This principle states that external entities should not interfere with the rule-making capabilities of the
organisation. Heller (1998) wrote that over-regulation leads to under-use of a CPR, which he called a
‘Tragedy of the Anti-Commons’. The use of copyright law has the capability of subverting the internal
rules of an information commons.
If users attempt to assert their intellectual property rights in participatory-sensing applications they
could gain more rights than the organisation initially permitted them with, or gain the power to prevent
others performing actions. For example, an analyst may determine that information he generates and
provisions is his intellectual property. If an evaluator then wants to appropriate this information and
generate some meta information about it, this could be seen as a derivative work, and therefore require the
permission of the analyst. Scenarios like this need to be prevented as they stiﬂe productivity (evaluators
will be cautious about what information they appropriate for fear of infringement) and undermine the
authority of the organisation.
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Luckily, there has already been signiﬁcant success in dealing with these issues. Licenses have been
used to ensure that certain rights are released when information is provisioned. In open-source software
Copyleft (Stallman, 1999) is an example which uses copyright law to its advantage to provide additional
beneﬁts in return. The Creative Commons13 licenses simplify the process of inferring what rights one has
regarding speciﬁc content. Care must be taken to choose appropriate licenses for the different forms of
information and knowledge generated from the sensing application.
In order to protect itself, an institution may require that contributions are licensed in a particular way:
per(A, provision(A, I, Obj) holdsAt T ←
licenceReq(I) = L holdsAt T ∧
licence(Obj) = L holdsAt T
We can also formalise aspects of some open-source licences. For example, the right to redistribute;
the right to read source code (which we interpret as an obligation to provision any knowledge which
Copylefted information is derived with); and the obligation to provision any derivative works back to the
institution(s) it originated from.
provision(A, I, Obj) initiates obl(A, provision(A, I, Alg)) at T ←
derivedFrom(_, Alg, Obj) = true ∧
licence(Obj) = copyleft holdsAt T ∧
provisioned(_, I, Alg) = false holdsAt T
per(A, provision(A, _, Obj) holdsAt T ←
licence(Obj) = copyleft holdsAt T
provision(A, I2, Obj) initiates obl(A, provision(A, I, Obj)) at T ←
derivedFrom(Source, _, Obj) = true ∧
licence(Source) = copyleft holdsAt T ∧
provisioned(_, I, Source) = true holdsAt T ∧
I≠ I2
Note that the presence of a derivative work can only be detected once it is provisioned elsewhere.
In addition, what constitutes derivedFrom can be difﬁcult to pinpoint in many cases (Lessig, 2004).
4.3 Evaluation
We now move on to the evaluative aspects of the IAD. We perform this evaluation with respect to current
participatory-sensing applications and our proposed self-organising approach based on Ostrom’s design
principles. We ﬁrst look at possible outcomes arising from applications, then determine a set of criteria to
evaluate them with.
4.3.1 Outcomes
We have talked of some current outcomes seen in participatory-sensing applications, namely enclosure
and inequity. This analysis should help us understand why we see these, but we will also look at other
potential outcomes we may observe from different organisational approaches.
∙ Enclosure: what we see in often participatory-sensing and other applications based around information
collection is the enclosure of the database. The data collector wants to keep the information to try and
derive as much value from it themselves as possible. This is ﬁrst inefﬁcient; we see that, when data is
made open much more total value is derived than any individual could achieve by themselves (Shadbolt
et al., 2012). Second, it deprives the original information provider, the user, from their own property.
∙ Access: the opposite to the negative outcome of enclosure is access. This has a beneﬁcial effect of
having an information and knowledge resource where there was none before. The beneﬁts of access
increase the more open the information is.
13 http://creativecommons.org
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∙ Equity: equity and inequity are outcomes based on the fairness of the allocation of the resource, in terms
of information and knowledge availability. Fairness can be evaluated in several different ways, many of
which are subjective. We can use a more objective measure by assessing whether each user is
compensated according to the value of their input to the system.
∙ Pollution: the insertion of incorrect information can affect the quality of the resource. This information
could be contributed accidentally, for example, a gatherer, whose sensor is faulty, provisioning
information or maliciously, for example, doctoring information to gain a competitive edge (Oreskes &
Conway, 2010). While the evaluator’s role can be partly to validate information and guard against
pollution, this can be very difﬁcult to practice, as has been seen from the manipulation of Facebook
likes, product reviews and Google PageRank. Pollution can be countered by trust and reputation
systems, or redundancy in the information-gathering process.
∙ Degradation and depletion: these outcomes are caused by either the removal of information or
insufﬁcient provision of new information. These relate to the endurance of a system. They will occur
either when the system does not react to changing external or internal conditions, or if the system
evolves into a ‘bad’ state, causing participation to be no longer worthwhile for some agents. Lack of
reactivity to changing conditions is likely to be caused by a lack of ﬂexibility in the institution, either by
not having mechanisms in place for reacting, or such mechanisms being blocked by entrenched interests
or inappropriate decision-making processes (North, 1990). Similarly, ‘bad’ states can be caused by
malicious groups of agents manipulating the institution for short-term beneﬁt.
4.3.2 Evaluative criteria
Finally, to access the efﬁcacy of the organisational structure on the outcomes of the system, we specify a
set of evaluative criteria. We evaluate outcomes and participant’s interactions with measurable values,
allowing objective comparison of systems and organisations. We take general criteria applied to knowledge
commons, as proposed byOstrom and Hess (2007), describe howwe can measure them, and then discuss the
effect we expect our framework will have on the values of the criteria. These criteria are: increase in
knowledge, sustainability and preservation, participation standards, economic efﬁciency and equity through
ﬁscal equivalence.
Certainly a successful participatory-sensing application will lead us to have increased knowledge, in
terms of more information derived from a large pool of sensor information. However, we may also see an
improvement in the knowledge being applied to the information by analysts and evaluators. In academia it
is generally accepted that open collaboration can improve the quality of knowledge generated. Allowing
participants to share their knowledge and then allow others to modify and improve it is an efﬁcient way of
increasing knowledge, and one which could be leveraged in participatory sensing. Therefore, the increase
in knowledge can be measured as the quantity and quality of information generated by the application.
Quantity of provision is achieved through high participation standards and incentivisation. In our
survey we saw several methods of incentivising provision, and our self-organising approach makes several
of these methods available as rules-in-use. Quality is maintained through effective monitoring. We have
discussed how monitoring can be achieved in our system and be responsive to increases in malicious
actions using Principles 4 and 5. The differentiating factor between our proposed framework and other
participatory-sensing applications is the pool of knowledge available in parallel with information. This
permissive sharing of knowledge, allowing for iterative improvements by many disparate contributors, is
an effective method for the increase of knowledge, as demonstrated by academia, FOSS and Wikipedia.
Sustainability and preservation of the organisation can be measured in terms of how long the system
endures before participation ceases or falls below a certain threshold (where the system is not longer
economically viable). To achieve sustainability it must be possible to meet the needs of the majority of
participants over the long term, and also to react to changes in conditions. For example, combating a rise in
malicious actors before the information pool becomes over-polluted.
Linked to sustainability are participation standards. This relates to the number of participants in the
system (and in each user role), as well as the level of contribution from each of those participants. Low
levels of participation or asymmetric participation (i.e. appropriating more than one provides) may be
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interpreted as free-riding, depending on the system’s rules. Free-riding is a frequent negative behaviour in
the commons and is likely to affect participation standards if not controlled.
Through collective choice, a self-organising institution should be more sustainable than dictatorial
institutions, as each agent is properly enfranchised and is able to address any issues they have with the
current rules. Equally effective self-organisation should imply good reactivity to changing conditions.
However, we must consider the possible implications of inappropriate collective-choice procedures which
can cause deadlocks. Voting mechanisms can be manipulated, or unrealistic win criteria may be required
for the passing of motions (Pitt et al., 2011). In social systems we can identify these issues and attempt to
work around them, but in computational systems collective choice will simply grind to a halt. Therefore,
we must be careful in the supply of institutions that these issues are considered.
Participation standards can be maintained through both enfranchisement and incentivisation. Participatory
sensing also has a promotional aspect to it, which helps to gain and maintain participation. For example,
OpenSignal largely relies on media publicity to attract users. This is an aspect where open access to
information helps. Users are more likely to engage with an organisation if they initially get something for
free. This gives them an idea of the product and its value, and may then lead to a more active role in the
institution. BothWikipedia and FOSS projects work based on this concept, however, they only need a very
small proportion of appropriators to provision to the knowledge pool.
It is also possible to measure the economic efﬁciency of a participatory-sensing application. We can
count the utility generated by the consumers through the use of information appropriated and compare this
to the total cost of maintaining the resource. This cost contains facility costs and the individual costs
incurred by participants in information gathering and processing.
If we compare centralised with self-organising approaches according to this metric, it is difﬁcult to
determine which will perform better. A self-organising institution requires additional facilities for the
execution of the governance layer of the application. Our position is, however, that a self-organising
institution will be able to generate more value under the same conditions, due to the outcomes we have
discussed, than a dictatorial one. In order to be more efﬁcient overall, this increase in generated value must
outweigh the additional operating costs.
Finally, we can assess equity through ﬁscal equivalence. This is a measure of the ratio of effort put in
versus beneﬁt extracted from a system. An observation from other knowledge commons is that consumers
often beneﬁt for little or no effort (e.g. Wikipedia, open-access publishing, FOSS). However, this beneﬁt is
not at a cost to the knowledge providers—in these examples consumption by others usually beneﬁts the
providers, helping them achieve ﬁscal equivalence—but is a form of redistributional equity. In participatory
sensing there is not such a strong beneﬁt to information providers from its consumption so we focus more on
ﬁscal equivalence and equality.
4.4 Supply of a participatory-sensing commons
The ﬁnal question we must answer is how we can enable the supply of an institution as we have described
for participatory sensing. Our requirements are a platform which can be easily deployed and is capable of
providing a technical means to administer the rules-in-use needed to satisfy Ostrom’s principles, and
therefore create a sustainable institution around the participatory-sensing application. We review the
suitability of existing platforms for use with our framework, and advocate one which we believe ﬁts our
criteria best.
There exist several platforms speciﬁcally for the deployment of participatory sensing. CarTel (Hull et al.,
2006) is a centralised system designed to accommodate heterogeneous sensor data and provides a
Web-based portal for data access. SenseWeb (Kansal et al., 2007) provides a shared resource for concurrent
sensing applications with a centralised coordinator directing information acquisition and aggregation. It
enables users demanding information to provide incentives for those who are able to provide it. The GSN
(Aberer et al., 2006) is a p2p network of sensor nodes which can advertise and respond to queries for data
streams across the network. G-Sense (Perez et al., 2010) is a platform which uses a hybrid architecture to
achieve scalability, using local centralised hubs which collaborate with a global p2p network. Demirbas et al.
(2010) leverage Twitter as infrastructure for information provision using encoded tweets.
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In general, similar to what we found in our review in Section 3, these platforms are dealing with
a particular technical challenge of participatory sensing. Therefore, these platforms do not specify how
rules for membership, provision and appropriation quantities, monitoring and accountability can be
implemented. In p2p platforms such as GSN, individuals may be able to control access to their own data
by selectively honouring requests, however, there is no governance oversight to keep consistency and
fairness. The use of Twitter as an independent third-party infrastructure provider provides a more transparent
operation, but sacriﬁces all control over access to the resource.
OMS14 is an open-source project which aims to give users control over their data in the cloud through a
technical architecture based on trust and the formation of self-organising groups. A key feature is a rule
engine governing access to data on a per-user basis. Such a platform could enable the formation of
institutions for participatory sensing with transparency over information access and use, but also with
overrides for users. The OMS architecture is p2p, enabling sharing of facility costs by design, and offering
scalability and data privacy. For these reasons we see OMS as an implementation avenue for our
framework.
5 Summary and conclusions
This paper has articulated the usefulness of the participatory-sensing paradigm and the shortfalls arising
from the lack of consideration of the impact of governance in current applications in this area. Our
approach aims to ﬁnd a method of democratising the large-scale aggregation of user-generated informa-
tion, with participatory sensing as an example of this process. As these systems are digital, and often
online, using electronic institutions and algorithmic governance enables us to bring both the enforcement
of rules, as well as governance determining what the rules are, into one place. It also enables autonomous
agents to interact with the governance layer along with human actors. In future work, we envision enabling
this interaction through serious games and gamiﬁcation, with an emphasis on the visualisation of the
‘state’ of the common pool and the rule (see Bourazeri et al., 2012 for an example using SmartMeters with
energy as the common pool), and through design contractualism, whereby design decisions and governance
models are manifested both in the code and in the interface (Pitt, 2012a).
In summary, the two main contributions are, namely:
∙ Data clouds in open participatory-sensing applications can be construed as information and knowledge
commons and thus characterised by provision and appropriation actions.
∙ A system for access control (i.e. provision and appropriation) in participatory-sensing applications can
be designed according to Ostrom’s institutional design principles for self-governing institutions and
formally speciﬁed in an action language.
We presented in Section 2 the literature on how information and knowledge can be seen as a commons,
and, being a system with the purpose of gathering information in order to generate new knowledge, that
participatory sensing enables the creation of information and knowledge commons. Following a review of
participatory-sensing applications we were able to characterise a generic participatory-sensing application
as a provision and appropriation system in Section 4. We then formally deﬁned a framework for the
management of an information and knowledge commons in participatory sensing.
We have two primary motivations for why such a framework is needed in this domain. First, through
our review of participatory sensing in Section 3, we identiﬁed a lack of governance supplied for applications.
Given that participatory sensing is a knowledge commons, appropriate governance, as stressed by Ostrom’s
(1990) work, is important for its successful management. The success of certain knowledge commons such
as Wikipedia and FOSS, which have been retrospectively shown to conform to the principles which Ostrom
proposed, further reinforces this point. Thus, as information and knowledge is gathered more and more on
the Internet, it is important that governance is supplied in order to fairly protect the interests of all involved
parties and stakeholders.
14 http://idhypercubed.org
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Second, the digitisation of information and knowledge has caused a shift in its properties as a good
(Hess & Ostrom, 2003). However, legal interpretations have not yet been fully updated to this new reality,
leading to exploitative and restrictive consequences (Lessig, 2004). We concluded that this gives the
knowledge creator complete control over what class of good their knowledge falls in to, and leads to a
dilemma where knowledge is enclosed for short-term beneﬁts and a negative long-term outcome.
With the presentation of this framework we are taking the ﬁrst steps to the supply of institutional
governance for managing information and knowledge commons in participatory-sensing applications. What
remains to do is a quantitative comparison of the different rule permutations which can be instantiated on top
of our framework and an objective comparison between centralised and community governance. Our
framework is ﬂexible enough to be able to represent a centralised governance as well as the self-organising
approach which is required for Ostrom’s principles. It is the aim of our future work to answer these questions.
In conclusion, we have shown that consideration of governance and supply thereof is important in
order to achieve the potential of the participatory-sensing paradigm. By drawing on the management
of the commons, we can create efﬁcient and empowering institutions around information and knowledge
resources, which can exploit the power of open data. In addition, given increasing concerns over data
acquisition and data privacy in the digital age, our general representation of a system for the provision and
appropriation of information could have applications beyond those which we have discussed here.
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